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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years charitable, nonprofit hospitals have
received income, property, and other tax exemptions.' These
tax subsidies were enacted at a time when hospitals were pri-
marily operated to provide recuperative care without charge to
the indigent and the destitute.'
In the latter half of the twentieth century charitable hos-
pitals have changed dramatically.3 Today's charitable hospitals
make available a technologically sophisticated setting in which
physicians and other health personnel perform complex diag-
nostic and therapeutic procedures. Charitable hospitals have
become wealthy institutions, with power and presence in the
community far beyond their almshouse forebears. The indi-
gent are seldom encouraged, and are sometimes shunned, from
seeking treatment in many of these institutions. Instead, char-
itable hospitals compete with profit-making hospitals for a
share of the privately and publicly insured patient market.
Despite these changes, charitable hospitals have enjoyed an
essentially unquestioned exemption from income, property,
and other taxes; access to tax-exempt financing; and other tax
subsidies.
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3. See generally R. STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND HEALTH (1989).
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Do contemporary charitable hospitals provide a sufficient
community benefit to justify the loss of government revenue
caused by their tax exemption? Focusing particularly on fed-
eral income tax exemption and on the community benefit
derived from the provision of services to persons unable to pay,
this Article argues that not all hospitals do. Accordingly, the
authors recommend that the Internal Revenue Service issue a
Revenue Ruling revising the current standards for federal
income tax exemption to encourage charitable hospitals to
clearly and explicitly identify and respond to health care
needs, including the needs of persons unable to pay, in their
local communities. The proposed text of such a ruling is set
forth in an appendix to this Article.
II. CHANGING HOSPITAL MARKET
The provision of charity care is discouraged by the contem-
porary hospital market. This is largely the result of actions
taken in the past ten years by payors of hospital care: state
and federal governments and private insurance companies.
Seeking to stem the inexorable inflation of medical care costs
in recent decades, public and private payors have established
hospital payment mechanisms that implicitly or explicitly
encourage nonprofit hospitals to reduce internal subsidies for
unpaid services and to compete on the basis of price. If the
basis for hospital tax exemption continues to be the provision
of uncompensated services as a quid pro quo for the tax sub-
sidy, current hospital payment strategies and tax exemption
may be operating at cross purposes.
A. Expansion of Proprietary Hospital Sector
The increased share of the hospital market held by propri-
etary institutions has prompted concern that the tax laws
unfairly discriminate between nonprofit and proprietary hospi-
tals. Nonprofit and proprietary hospitals increasingly look
more alike than different, both when measured in terms of
efficiency and provision of uncompensated services.4 A tax
subsidy for one otherwise indistinguishable sector of the hospi-
tal industry may dilute the economic incentives built into new
payment systems by supporting inefficient nonprofit institu-
tions or discouraging the expansion of their more efficient
4. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH
CARE (Bradford Gray, ed. 1986).
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competitors. 5
B. Access to Hospital Care
There is a growing recognition among health policymakers
and legislators that medical indigency is a serious and wide-
spread problem in the United States. Statistics and anecdotal
evidence support this view. It is estimated that 30 to 38 per-
cent of Americans, from 58.8 to 63.0 million people, are unin-
sured or underinsured.6
C C7anging Public Perception of the Hospital
In addition, the public has become uneasy with the
increasingly commercial behavior of hospitals. A recent
national public opinion survey reported that 67 percent of
respondents believe nonprofit hospitals are essentially "com-
mercial" entities, not social service organizations. State and
local property tax officials have made numerous well-publi-
cized efforts to forfeit the property tax exemption of nonprofit
hospitals.' The popular press has recounted numerous horror
stories of denial of care to persons unable to pay.9 Legislation
has been proposed that would curtail access to tax-exempt
bond financing for hospitals not providing a minimal volume of
care to the poor and link the federal income tax exemption to
the provision of specified levels of charity care.1" Forty-five
5. See Herzlinger & Krasker, Who Profits from Hospitals?, 65 HARV. Bus. REV. 93
(1987).
6. P. BUTLER, Too POOR To BE SICK: ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE FOR THE
UNINSURED 25 (1986).
7. Edgar, Public Hospitals Should Give Free Care and Pay Taxes, HOSPITALS 101,
Nov. 5, 1988, [hereinafter Opinion Survey].
8. See Tax Fever Infecting Nonprofit Hospitals, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MED.
AND HEALTH, Nov. 19, 1990, (20 states questioning nonprofit hospital tax exemption).
9. Several instances are described in Dallek and Waxman, "Patient Dumping". A
Crisis in Emergency Medical Care for the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1413-14
(1986). See also Milligan, Provisions of Uncompensated Care in American Hospitals:
The Role of the Tax Code, the Federal Courts, Catholic Health Care Facilities, and
Legal Governments in Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor, 31 J. CATH. LAW. 7
(1987).
10. H.R. 2207, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) would have restricted the use of tax-
exempt bonds by charitable hospitals that failed to achieve a certain level of charity
care. See Barker, Re-examining the 501(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable
Organizations, 3 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 539, 546-47 (1990). H.R. 5686, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess. would have required charitable hospitals to provide a minimum volume of
charity care, tied to the value of their tax exemption, to avoid an excise tax which
would be provided to their state to fund charity care in public and other charitable
hospitals.
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percent of the public believe that nonprofit hospitals should
forfeit their tax exemption."
D. Nonprofits Under Fire
The tax status of the entire nonprofit sector has been
questioned in recent years. The impetus for this scrutiny has
come from several fronts. There has been increasing competi-
tion between nonprofit and proprietary businesses. Travel
agencies, private educational institutions, sports clubs, and a
variety of health care providers have objected to the incursion
of nonprofits into their entrepreneurial domains and to the
subsidy they enjoy. The Small Business Administration has
devoted considerable attention to the issue, and the House
Ways and Means Committee on Tax Oversight has conducted
hearings on the "unrelated business income" of exempt organi-
zations.12 In the wake of the taxpayer's revolt, local govern-
ments have sought to identify new sources of tax revenue. It
has been suggested that exempt organizations, particularly
those such as hospitals that provide essentially commercial
services, are as heavy of a user of tax-supported public services
such as police, fire safety, and public roads as their taxable
counterparts. Tax exemption allows them to free-ride, increas-
ing the tax burden of non-exempt organizations.'
3
E. New Techniques for Tax Expenditure Analysis
In addition to direct expenditures, the federal budget con-
tains indirect expenditures accomplished through the tax sys-
11. Opinion Survey, supra note 7, at 101. This figure may reflect concern about
hospitals' diminishing indigent care levels among the 85 percent of the American
public who, according to another recent survey, believe hospitals should provide care
to everyone regardless of ability to pay. HMO Survey: A Mandate for High Quality
Health Care, 4 HEALTH MGMT. Q. 5 (1986).
12. The Small Business Administration has aggressively pursued the issue of
competition between tax-exempt nonprofits and small businesses. See SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNFAIR CoMPErrION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH
SMALL BUSINESS: AN ISSUE FOR THE 1980's (3rd ed. 1984). Concern about the scope of
income-producing activities by nonprofits prompted hearings by the House Ways and
Means Subcommittee on Oversight in 1987, and increased I.R.S. reporting
requirements.
13. See generally J. BENNET, UNFAIR COMPETITION; THE PROFITS OF NONPROFITS
(1989). For a scholarly critique of tax exemption for nonprofit organizations, including
charitable hospitals, that act essentially as commercial enterprises, see Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation,
91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
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tern. 4 When the tax code grants preferential treatment to
particular kinds of income through deductions, credits, or
exclusions, the government spends money on the underlying
object of that income as surely as if it had appropriated and
spent the funds.
Congress and the public have not traditionally subjected
the cost and relative value of this type of tax expenditure to
the scrutiny given direct expenditures. 5 However, in recent
years the federal government has paid increasing attention to
the cost and utility of tax expenditures.' 6 Tax exemption for
nonprofit charitable organizations has been recognized as a tax
expenditure. 7 Recently, the U.S. General Accounting Office
evaluated the cost and utility of the federal income tax exemp-
tion for nonprofit hospitals by calculating the revenue loss
associated with the federal and state charitable hospital income
tax subsidies and comparing this amount with the estimated
value of charity care provided by the hospitals.'" Evidence
from the GAO Report suggests that there are many charitable
hospitals that cost society more than they provide in return.' 9
F. Hospital Exemption
At the present time charitable hospitals unquestionably
qualify for federal income tax exemption.2 0 The most recent
14. The idea of the "tax expenditure" budget originated in the writings of Stanley
Surrey. See S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973). It is now an accepted term
in the budget lexicon. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT-. FIsCAL YEAR 1989 (1988) (list of tax
expenditures in federal budget) (Special Analysis G).
15. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Exzpenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970).
16. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was in part an effort to excise hidden tax
subsides from the Internal Revenue Code.
17. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983),
the Supreme Court acknowledged as much, stating- "Both tax exemptions and tax
deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax
exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount
of tax it would otherwise have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are
similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's contributions." Id.
at 544. See also S. SuRREY & G. MCDANEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 219 (1985) (nonprofit
hospital tax exemption is a tax expenditure).
18. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BETTER
STANDARDS NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION (1990), [hereinafter GAO Report].
19. See infra text accompanying notes 93-100.
20. The Internal Revenue Code provides exemption from federal income taxation
for: "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
1991]
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IRS revenue ruling on this issue states that the provision of
hospital services is an exempt charitable purpose as long as a
hospital promotes the health of a class of persons broad
enough to benefit the community and operates to serve public
rather than private interests.2 ' A hospital may meet these
standards if it offers services to those who can pay, including
Medicare and Medicaid patients; has a governing board of
prominent citizens and an open medical staff policy; and
applies surplus funds to improving operations, capital plant,
medical education, and research.22 It need not provide what is
known as "charity care": services to indigent patients without
expectation of payment. 23
Of course, the majority of charitable hospitals provide at
least some charity care. Some deliver substantial amounts.24
The impetus to do so, however, likely comes more from an
internally-generated sense of mission or an accident of proxim-
ity to a poor neighborhood than from concern with Internal
Revenue Code compliance.
This state of affairs would certainly surprise those who
administered the federal income tax laws for the first forty-
plus years of their existence.2 5 It would probably startle those
who founded America's first hospitals, for the very notion of a
charitable hospital that did not serve the poor would seem
utterly foreign to them.26 It seems particularly surprising in
light of the multi-billion dollar tax subsidy granted to charita-
competition ... , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . " I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986). The Supreme Court has ruled that as a general
proposition hospitals are eligible for exemption as charitable organizations under
§ 501(c)(3). Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 29 (1976).
Under the Code, an exempt charitable entity must be both "organized" and "operated"
for exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a). The organizational requirement is
met if the entity's articles of incorporation limit it to exempt purposes and do not
expressly empower it to engage, except to an insubstantial degree, in activities not in
furtherance or its exemption. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i). The operational
component requires the organization to engage primarily in activities that accomplish
its exempt purposes. It also prohibits inurement of the organization's net earnings to
the benefit of private individuals, and certain political activities. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c). The requisites of "charitability", including the provision of services
to those unable to pay, are operational issues.
21. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
22. Id.; Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
23. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 28-40.
26. See generally C. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM (1987).
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ble hospitals by the federal government.2
G. Origins of Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Hospitals
Exemption provisions for charitable organizations have
always been present in federal income tax laws. The first
broad corporate income tax, the Tariff Act of 1894, exempted
"corporations, companies, or associations organized and con-
ducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational pur-
poses."'  Similarly, exemption provisions were included in all
the subsequent pre-Code Revenue Acts.- Additional exempt
categories and restrictions were added from time to time. The
1939 Code incorporated the accumulated language of the reve-
nue acts and, in turn, was included (with additional prohibi-
tions on political activity and the inclusion of a public safety
testing purpose) in the 1954 and 1986 Codes.'
H. Definition of "Charitability"
Courts and commentators sometimes speak as if there
existed two partially exclusive competing definitions of char-
ity.3' One, the so-called "popular and ordinary" or "soup
kitchen" definition, says that charity consists exclusively of the
27. Estimates of the amount of the tax subsidy for charitable hospitals vary.
There are difficult methodological problems in estimating taxes that would have been
paid by an exempt organization had it been taxable. The estimates are least for ad
valorem taxes and greatest for income-related taxation. A recent estimate that
includes all the major subsidies (federal and state income tax exemption, state and
local property and sales tax, issuance of tax-exempt bonds and deductibility of
charitable contributions) but unfortunately does not specify estimation methods is
contained in Copeland & Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 3
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 161, 167 (1990). The annual subsidy in the mid-1980's is
estimated to have been $8.5 billion.
28. Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894).
29. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 101(6), 52 Stat. 481; Revenue Act of 1936, ch.
690, § 101(6), 49 Stat. 1674; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 103(6), 48 Stat. 700; Revenue
Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 103(6), 47 Stat. 193, Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 103(6), 45
Stat. 813; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 231(6), 44 Stat. 40; Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 231(6), 43 Stat. 282; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 321(6), 43 Stat. 282; Revenue
Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 231(6), 42 Stat. 253; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat.
1076; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 11(a)(6), 39 Stat. 766;; Tariff of 1913, ch. 16,
§ II(g)(a), 38 Stat. 172; Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113.
30. I.R.C. § of 1939, § 101(6) (1939); I.R.C. of 1954, § 501(c)(3)(1954); I.R.C. of 1986,
§ 501(c)(3) (1986).
31. See, e.g., Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286-
89 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See generally HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX-ExEmP'r ORGANIZATIONS 56-7 (5th ed. 1987).
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relief of poverty, or almsgiving."s A hospital seeking to come
within this definition would be dedicated exclusively to caring
for indigent clients. The second definition, commonly referred
to as the "legal" definition and said to underlie the common
law standards for qualification of charitable trusts, deems as
charitable any activities beneficial to a broad class of the pub-
lic, which may, but need not, include the poor.33 A hospital
could come within this definition simply by making its facili-
ties available to all paying members of the public.
In fact, charity has a range of possible meanings, including
numerous intermediate meanings in which charity implies
some combination of almsgiving and broad public benefit. For
example, charity can be interpreted to refer primarily to the
relief of poverty, but to include some service to the nonpoor.
Conversely, charity can refer to any activity of broad social
benefit that includes some service to the poor. Under the first
of these approaches, a hospital would qualify as a charity if it
primarily treated an indigent clientele but also made its facili-
ties available to occasional paying patients. Under the second
approach, a hospital would qualify as a charity if it primarily
served the paying public but also delivered some care to
indigents.
"Charitable" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code,
nor is it self-defining. 4 It is not possible to discern with any
degree of confidence a congressional intent to select either the
"relief of poverty" or '%road social benefit" definition of char-
ity from the wording of the law or its legislative history.'
Probably neither was consciously intended. It seems more
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 369, comment a (1959).
33. Commentators deduce that any socially beneficial activity qualifies as charity
from (a) the variety of charitable purposes listed in the Preamble to the Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601 (Stat. 43 Eliz. I, c.4.); and (b) the multitude of aims courts have
upheld over the years as charitable trust purposes. See SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS,
§ 370 (3rd ed. 1967 and 1988 Supp.); BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 370
(rev. 2d ed. 1977 and 1988 Cum. Pocket Part).
34. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
35. Section 501(c)(3) and its predecessors are sufficiently cryptic that either
interpretation can survive but not flourish. Thus, applying the principle that all words
in statutes have meaning, in 1923 the Internal Revenue Service concluded that since
all the statutorily-listed organizations qualified as common law charitable trusts,
Congress must have meant "charitable organizations" to be confined to those devoted
to almsgiving. Otherwise, listing the others would have been pointless. I.T. 1800, 11-2
C.B. 152 (1923). In 1959 the Service reversed field. Treas. Reg. § § § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(2)(1959) announced that the Code used "charitable" in its "generally accepted
legal sense", and accordingly downgraded relief of poverty from the primary charitable
purpose to one of several. Although the IRS has never explained the grounds for this
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likely that, by choosing a word without a fixed meaning, Con-
gress intended to assign tax officials the task of defining "char-
ity" by applying contemporary standards and notions of public
benefit to its accumulated common law meaning. This is the
Supreme Court's interpretation, announced in the Court's most
thorough analysis of charitable exemption in recent years, Bob
Jones University v. United States.'
In Bob Jones University, the Court held that racially
exclusionary private school admission standards violated an
established national policy embedded in the charitable exemp-
tion against racial discrimination in education.37 The Court
concluded that in adopting the charitable exemption, Congress
was "guided by the common law of charitable trusts."'  Long-
recognized fundamental principles of charitable trust law were
incorporated into the income tax exemption, to be defined and
interpreted in accordance with contemporary standards.' In
particular, the Court indicated that Congress intended that
Section 501(c)(3) incorporate two principles: (1) that charities
advance purposes consistent with fundamental public policy;
and (2) that charities provide a public benefit to compensate
for the public revenue loss caused by their exemption.40
reversal, it probably shifted to the rule of construction that words retain their common
legal meaning when incorporated into statutes.
The legislative history of the charitable exemption is sparse. In Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588, n.12 (1983), the Supreme Court suggests that in
drafting § 501(c)(3), Congress was guided by the common law of charitable trusts.
However, the Court's evidence-similar wording in pre-Code Revenue Act charitable
exemption provision and descriptions of charitable purposes in the English law of
charity and the Revenue Act draftsmen's presumed familiarity with English tax law-
is weak. The Court's assertion actually amounts to little more than a restatement of
the principle that words in statutes retain their common law meaning. More recent
legislative actions tell little. A 1924 tax amendment proposed to extend the definition
of "charitable" for purposes of the contribution deduction to entities organized and
operated for "preventive and constructive service for relief, rehabilitation, health,
character building, and citizenship." 26 CONG. TREAs. REG. 8171 (1924). The stated
goal was to override I.T. 1800, supra, and allow charitable contributions to social
service organizations not serving the poor. The amendment was opposed, not out of
support for the Rule, but because it would have excessively widened the scope of
purposes to which contributions were deductible. The amendment was later
withdrawn. 26 CONG. REC. 8173. In 1969 legislation was proposed to expressly exempt
hospitals, in order to free them from IRS challenges based on insufficiency of charity
care. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 92st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1688. The proposal was not enacted.
36. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
37. Id. at 595-96.
38. Id. at 588 n.12.
39. Id. at 593 n.20.
40. Id. at 586.
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I. "Charity" in the Courts
Historically, IRS criteria for measuring the adequacy of
charitable hospitals' contributions to charity have generally
reflected the standards contained in contemporaneous judicial
decisions. These decisions were reached in the context of
reviewing the validity of charitable trusts for hospital pur-
poses, or the entitlement of charitable hospitals to exemption
from various state and local taxes.41 The decisions rejected the
idea that charity demanded exclusive attention to the indigent,
but made the accessibility of the hospital to all without regard
to ability to pay as an important consideration.
In the 19th century, a number of courts addressed the
charitable status of hospitals, nursing homes, and other health-
related institutions, and their duty to serve the poor.' These
cases clearly indicate that a trust for the promotion of health
through the establishment of a hospital or other health service
institution was a valid charitable use. For practical rather than
legal reasons, requisite levels of indigent care were not an issue
in these decisions. The small number of hospitals in existence
before the turn of the century primarily treated a "deserving
poor" clientele.43  Because no charitable hospital was estab-
lished for a primary purpose other than indigent care, the
existence of a legally-required minimum level of indigent care
would have been a purely hypothetical question.
Surgical intervention became more feasible because of
41. See infra text accompanying notes 42-58.
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 190-91 (1882) (bequest to establish
hospital for sick and indigent females sufficiently definite to be valid); cf Inglis v.
Sailors' Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830) (marine hospital for aged, decrepit, and worn-
out sailors); Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1877) (trust for
establishment of hospital foundlings upheld; "[e]ndowment of hospitals for the
afflicted and destitute ... is one of the commonest [sic] forms of [charitable] uses.");
Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 30 A. 50 (1894) (devise in
trust to establish free beds at mental hospital creates a valid trust); State v. Board of
Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So. 872 (1898) (hospitals or infirmaries exempt from
taxation as charitable institutions); State v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263, aff'd, 74 Mo. 476,
(1881) (hospital building whose object is charity and whose profit from pay patients is
applied exclusively charity exempt from taxation as purely public charity); People v.
Purdy, 58 Hun. 386, 12 N.Y.S. 307 (1890); City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hosp.
for the Insane, 154 Pa. 9, 25 A. 1076 (1893).
43. Early hospitals were essentially almshouses specializing in the chronically ill
and decrepit. Contemporary medical science emphasized restoration of health through
rest and diet rather than active intervention in disease processes, and the role of
hospitals was accordingly limited. See generally C. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF
STRANGERS: THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL SYSTEM (1987).
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advances in theories of disease and medical technology." Hos-
pitalization became more desirable, and more expensive. Hos-
pitals began to attract paying patients for the services they
could provide. They charged fees to cover rising costs and to
subsidize continued treatment of the poor. When confronted
with this trend, courts across the country ruled that hospitals
could admit paying patients and still qualify as charitable insti-
tutions.4 However, the same courts repeatedly affirmed that
the touchstone of charitable hospital status was a willingness
to treat patients without regard to their ability to pay. Exces-
sive attention to paying patients and zealous billing and collec-
tion efforts were evidence of unwillingness to treat the poor.4
So too were low percentages of indigent patients.4 7  Courts
often emphasized that revenues derived from paying patients
would enable hospitals to extend their capacity to provide free
care.4 It was acknowledged that revenues from paying
patients enabled the hospital to maintain its physical plant and
44. See id. at 122-166 (1987).
45. Hot Springs School Dist. v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497, 106 S.W. 954 (1907);
Scripps Memorial Hosp. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 669, 151 P.2d
109 (1944); Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla.), on
remand 151 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for
Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949); Board of Review v. Chicago Polyclinic, 233
Ill. 268, 84 N.E. 220 (1908); Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Board of Review of
Peoria Co., 231 Ill. 317, 83 N.E. 272 (1907); Dayton v. Trustees of Speers Hosp., 165 Ky.
56, 176 S.W. 361 (1915); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann.
223, 26 So. 872 (1898); New England Sanitarium v. Sloneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91 N.E.2d
385 (1910); Gundy v. R.B. Smith Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 293 Mich. 36, 291 N.W. 213
(1940); Michigan Sanitarium v. City of Battle Creek, 138 Mich. 676, 101 N.W. 855
(1904); Hennepin County v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460, 8 N.W. 595
(1881); State ex rel. Alexian Bros. v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263, aff'd., 74 Mo. 476 (1881);
St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. 981 (1922); People v.
Purdy, 58 Hun. 386, 12 N.Y.S. 307 (1890); Tulsa County v. Sisters of the Sorrowful
Mother, 141 Okla. 32, 283 P. 984 (1930); City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital
for the Insane, 154 Pa. 9, 25 A. 1076 (1893); Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n v. Baker, 40 S.D. 226,
167 N.W. 148 (1918); Brattleboro Retreat v. Brattleboro, 106 Vt. 228, 173 A. 209 (Vt.
1934); In re Rust's Estate, 168 Wash. 344, 12 P.2d 396 (1932); Reynolds Memorial Hosp.
v. County Ct., 78 W. Va. 685, 90 S.E. 238 (1916).
46. See O'Brien v. Physician's Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Ohio St. 1, 116 N.E. 975 (1917).
47. See Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
48. Hot Springs School Dist. v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497, 106 S.W. 954 (1907);
Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Board of Review of Peoria Co., 231 Ill. 317, 83
N.E. 272 (1907); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26
So. 872 (1898); State ex rel. Alexian Bros. Hosp. v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263, aff'd, 74
Mo. 476 (1881); People v. Purdy, 58 Hun. 386, 12 N.Y.S. 307 (1890); O'Brien v.
Physicians Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Ohio St. 1, 116 N.E. 975 (1917); City of Philadelphia v.
Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane, 154 Pa. 9, 25 A. 1076 (Pa. 1893); Baptist Hosp. v.
Nashville, 156 Tenn. 589, 3 S.W.2d 1059 (1928); Scott v. All Saints Hosp., 203 S.W. 146
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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equipment.49 However, the hospital that provided little or no
charity care stood to lose its exemption.'
In terms of doctrine, the courts seem to have accepted
neither the "popular and ordinary" definition of hospitals'
charitable obligations nor the so-called "legal" definition. Hos-
pitals were not required to devote themselves exclusively to
treatment of those unable to pay but neither were they permit-
ted to turn away the indigent. The courts opted for an inter-
mediate standard that looked to the absence of admission
criteria based on ability to pay and the presence of something
more than minimal numbers of indigent patients as the basic
criteria of charitability. Treating paying patients was allowed,
but it was the delivery of care to those unable to pay that con-
stituted the "charity" that entitled a hospital to preferred trust
or tax exempt status.
J. Early IRS Interpretation
The IRS' interpretation of the obligations of charitable
hospitals during the first half of the 20th century was, if any-
thing, stricter than the prevailing standard. The IRS did, how-
ever, acknowledge that relief of poverty need not be the sole
purpose of an exempt charity. 5' Consistent with the Commis-
sioner's narrow reading of the meaning of "charity" at the
49. Scripps Memorial Hosp. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d 669, 151
P.2d 109 (1944); Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Board of Review, 231 Ill. 317, 83
N.E. 272 (1907); Nuns of Third Order of St. Dominican v. Younkin, 118 Kan. 554, 235 P.
869 (1925); Michigan Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Battle Creek, 138
Mich. 676, 101 N.W. 855 (1904); Bd. of Supervisors v. Jackson Hosp. Benev. Assoc., 180
Miss. 129, 177 So. 27 (1937); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189
N.W. 981 (1922); Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n v. Baker, 40 S.D. 226, 167 N.W. 148 (1918);
Baptist Hosp. v. Nashville, 156 Tenn. 589, 3 S.W.2d 1059 (1928); Santa Rosa Infirmary v.
City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926 (Tex. Crim. 1924); In re Rust's Estate, 168 Wash. 344,
12 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1932).
50. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933); Salisbury
Hosp., Inc. v. Rowan County, 205 N.C. 8, 169 S.E. 805 (1933); Knoxville v. Fort Sanders
Hosp. 148 Tenn. 699, 257 S.W. 408 (1924); William Budge Memorial Hosp. v. Marghan,
79 Utah 516, 3 P.2d 258 (1931); Rogers Memorial Saniturium v. Summit, 228 Wis. 507,
279 N.W. 623 (1938).
51. Regulations implementing the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that exempt
charities would include associations for relief of families of clergymen (even though
they donate to the association), for furnishing the services of trained nurses to persons
unable to pay, or for aiding the general body of litigants by improving the efficient
administration of justice. Treas. Reg. § 45 (1919), compiled in 10 Fox, INTERNAL
REVENUE REGULATIONS (1951) [hereinafter Fox]. These provisions imply a concept of
charity extending, at least at some instances, beyond the relief of poverty. Although
family relief funds and free nursing services might both constitute almsgiving, some
beneficiaries of improved administration of justice could be non-indigent.
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time,52 the IRS placed relief of poverty at the core of the chari-
table exemption. Treasury Regulation 65, adopted to accom-
pany the Revenue Act of 1924, provided that "[c]orporations
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes
comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the poor. '
In an obvious effort to assure that indigent patients were being
cared for, treasury regulations expressly required charitable
hospitals to notify the IRS whether nonpaying patients were
accepted.' Furthermore, the IRS apparently did not willingly
embrace the proposition, widely-accepted at the time, that
charitable hospitals could serve paying patients.
55
A 1956 revenue ruling set forth in detail the IRS' view of
the charitable obligations of exempt hospitals. Revenue Ruling
56-1851 announced that an exempt hospital "must be operated
to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay"
and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay.
The Revenue Ruling continued as follows:
It is normal for hospitals to charge those able to pay for
services rendered in order to meet the operating expenses of
the institution, without denying medical care or treatment to
others unable to pay. The fact that its charity record is rela-
tively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not operated for
charitable purposes to the full extent of its financial ability.
It may furnish services at reduced rates which are below
cost, and thereby render charity in that manner. It may also
set aside earnings which it uses for improvements and addi-
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
53. Treas. Reg. 65 (1924), compiled in, 10 Fox, INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS
(1951). The relief of poverty rationale for charitable income tax exemption was
repeatedly reenacted in the treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 69 (1926), Treas.
Reg. § 74, § 527 (1928), Treas. Reg. § 77, § 527 (1932), Treas. Reg. § 86, § 101(6)-i (1934),
Treas. Reg. § 94, § 101(6)-i (1936), Treas. Reg. § 101, § 11 (1938), all compiled in Fox,
supra note 51; Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 885, 39-1 C.B. Pt. 1, 396 (extending prior
regulations to 1939 Code); Treas. Reg. § 103, § 19.101 (6)-i (1940), compiled in 3 Fox,
TREASURY REGULATIONS PROMULGATED DURING 1939-1950 (1951); 26 C.F.R. § 19.101
(1943); 26 C.F.R. 19.101 (1953).
54. Tress. Reg. § 45 (1919) compiled in 10 Fox, INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS
(1951).
55. See, e.g., Davis Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 372 (1945), in which the
IRS argued without success that a Hospital should be denied exemption for charging
fees to those able to pay. The proposition was, however, accepted by the Tax Court
and federal appellate courts. See, e.g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. City of
Battle Creek, 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942) (sanatorium charging people able to pay for
services but not denying treatment to those unable to pay entitled to federal income
tax exemption). The IRS eventually moderated its views on private pay patients in
Rev. Rul. 56-181, infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956 C.B. 202.
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tions to hospital facilities. It must not, however, refuse to
accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for
such services. Furthermore, if it operates with the expecta-
tion of full payment from all those to whom it renders serv-
ices, it does not dispense charity merely because some of its
patients fail to pay for the services rendered.57
Revenue Ruling 56-185 indicated that the IRS agreed with
the prevailing view of courts across the country that charitable
hospitals were obliged to provide services without charge to
persons unable to pay.'
K. Contemporary Court Rulings
It is unlikely that any private hospital today is operated
primarily to serve charity patients. In the latter half of the
twentieth century, hospitals greatly accelerated the transition
from their almshouse origins to modern businesses.' Costs of
hospital care soared, increasing the burden of charity care on
hospital finances and making the hospital financially inaccessi-
ble to people with moderate incomes as well as the destitute.
Today many charitable hospitals consciously attempt to mini-
mize the levels of charity care they provide.' The actual
57. Id. at 203.
58. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. City of Battle Creek, 126 F.2d 405 (5th
Cir. 1942); Goldsby King Memorial Hosp. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1944);
Davis Hosp., Inc. v. Commr, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1945) (hospital receiving no
compensation from 30-40 percent of its patients entitled to federal income exemption);
Intercity Hosp. Ass'n v. Squire, 56 F.Supp. 472 (W.D. Wash. 1944) (hospital with
extremely liberal rule concerning admittance of unfunded patients entitled to social
security tax exemption); Lorain Avenue Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141 (1958)
(hospital providing free services to only a small percent of patients not entitled to
federal income tax exemption; charging moderate, compared to high, fees insufficient
grounds for exemption); Sonora Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519 (1966),
aff'd per curiain, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968) (hospital providing de minimis free care
not entitled to federal income tax exemption; some record of charity care beyond
diagnosis and cure of disease is required).
59. See generally R. STEVENS, supra note 3.
60. "[M]any private hospitals have for years been transferring poor or uninsured
patients to public hospitals, admitting only those persons who are well insured or are
affluent enough to pay the high cost of hospital care." 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHIcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 254 (1983). "[Flinancial pressures
under which private nonprofit hospitals operate have already led many of them to
turn away patients who cannot pay or to severely limit the number of indigents they
will admit." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 265 (1974). For an
empirical study of patient dumping, see Schiff, Transfers to a Public Hosp.; A
Prospective Study of 467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986). The GAO Report
found that many charitable hospitals in the study communities limited a majority of
charity care to that initiated in the emergency room.
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levels of indigent care provided by charitable hospitals are low
in comparison with the levels reported in the court decisions
from the first half of the century.6 ' Horror stories of hospitals
turning away acutely sick or injured persons unable to pay
have become commonplace. 2
In the last fifty years, state courts, and occasionally legisla-
tures, have continued to examine the free care obligations of
charitable organizations, generally in the context of challenges
to their property tax exemptions. In the majority of jurisdic-
tions where the question of free care has been raised in the
hospital context, the provision of charity care and the accessi-
bility of the hospital to indigent patients continue to be deter-
minative, or at least important, criteria for entitlement to tax
exemption.63
61. See infra text accompanying note 65. Perhaps to downplay their dramatic
shift in charitable service, hospital advocates have argued that the industry continues
to provide "charity" in the form of discounts between a hospital's stated charges and
the rates it negotiates with large payors such as Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross, and
other insurers, and bad debt losses. See LEWIN, ECKELS, & ROENIGK, SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT THE PROVISION OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE BY NoT-FoR-PRoFIT
HOSPITALS (1988). As political arguments for more generous Medicare and Medicaid
payment, these arguments may carry some weight. But the claim that price discounts
and bad debt losses constitute charity in any legal sense is hard to accept. It is
analogous to the claim that taxpayers are entitled to charitable deductions for the
difference between the price they pay for goods or services provided by a charitable
organization and the market value of goods and services received. These claims are
evaluated by whether the excess payment is motivated by donative intent or is a quid
pro quo. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1986).
Medicare, Medicaid, and other large payor price discounts are clearly granted by
charitable hospitals as a quid pro quo for such business, not as a gift. See Mancino,
supra note 1, at 1047 (Medicare contractual allowances irrelevant to hospital charity
record after enactment of prospective payment system). Similarly, bad debt losses are
costs of conducting business as a hospital, incurred by charitable and proprietary
hospitals alike without donative intent. Highland Park Hosp. v. Department of
Revenue, 155 Ill. App. 3d 272, 280, 507 N.E.2d 1331, 1336 (1987) (hospital not entitled to
claim amounts determined to be uncollectible bad debts as free care to justify property
tax exemption); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, 173 So. 2d 176, 185 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 183 So.2d 211 (1965) (one nursing home resident's
inability to meet contractual obligation to pay insufficient to justify property tax
exemption; possibility of non-payment is foreseeable business risk).
62. See Dallek & Waxman, supra note 9.
63. Alabama: ALA. CODE, § 40-9-1(2) (1990 Supp.) (hospital property exempt if at
least 15% of business is charity); Arkansas: Burgess v. Four States Mem. Hosp., 250
Ark. 485, 465 S.W.2d 693 (1971) (hospital open to public, not refusing service on
account of inability to pay, and applying profits to maintaining hospital and extending
and enlarging its charity entitled to property tax exemption); cf. Sebastian County
Equalization Board v. W. Ark. Counseling and Guidance Center, 296 Ark. 207, 752
S.W.2d 755 (1988) (community mental health clinic; similar holding); Delaware:
Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951) (hospital open to public
regardless of financial ability entitled to tax exemption); Illinois: Highland Park
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The cases do suggest an increasing recognition that hospi-
tals operate like businesses. The proposition that paying
patients may be admitted and fees charged continues to be
accepted. In addition, there is greater acceptance of the prac-
tice of billing all patients and attempting to collect on all
bills.' A reduced emphasis on target levels or percentages of
free care is evident. Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that
tax exempt charitable hospitals must not refuse to serve
patients on account of an inability to pay.
Hosp. v. Department of Revenue, 155 Ill. App. 3d 272, 507 N.E.2d 1331 (1987) (hospital's
immediate care facility billed all patients and did not advertise availability of free care,
not entitled to property tax exemption); Minnesota: Mayo Found. v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 306 Minn. 25, 236 N.W.2d 767 (1975) (hospital open to all without regard to
ability to pay and which provided substantial free care entitled to sales and use tax
exemption); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN., § 27-31-1(f) (1972) (property of Hospitals
which maintain one or more charity wards for charity patients exempt from taxation);
City of Natchez v. Natchez Sanatorium Benev. Ass'n., 191 Miss. 91, 2 So.2d 798 (1941)
(hospital providing charity care entitled to property tax exemption even though it did
not set aside specific charity beds); Missouri: Community Memorial Hosp. v. City of
Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1967) (hospital extending service to usual and ordinary
number of indigent patients entitled to property tax exemption); Callaway Community
Hosp. v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. App. 1988) (City of Moberly applied; hospital
which did not encourage charity patients but which had never refused admission for
inability to pay entitled to property tax exemption); Ohio: Cleveland Osteopathic
Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 91 N.E.2d 261 (1950) (hospital exempt from
property tax should have as important objective care of poor, needy, and distressed
who are unable to pay, although admitting some paying patients will not necessarily
destroy its charitable character); Pennsylvania: West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of
Property Assessment, 500 Pa. 236, 455 A.2d 1170 (1982) (hospital with policy of open
admission without regard to patient's ability to pay entitled to property tax
exemption); cf. Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306
(1985) (multihospital shared data system not providing free services denied sales and
use tax exemption); Tennessee: Baptist Hosp. v. City of Nashville, 156 Tenn. 589, 3
S.W.2d 1059 (1928) (hospital rendering free services to 10-15% of patients entitled to
property tax exemption notwithstanding charging of fees to those able to pay, since
fees enabled institution to care for more poor patients); but see Downtown Hosp. Ass'n
v. Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn. App. 1988) (under Baptist Hospital,
hospital does not lose exemption because it receives substantial payment for the
services it renders to patients); Texas: Aransas Hosp. v. Aransas Pass Indep. School
Dist., 521 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App. 1975) (hospital providing less than 1% of gross
revenues in free care not entitled to property tax exemption); Lamb County Appraisal
v. South Plains Hosp., 688 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App. 1985) (hospital providing charity care
to a small pertentage of patients entitled to property tax exemption); Utah: Utah
County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (hospital providing
less than 1% of gross revenues as charity not entitled to property tax exemption;
charity is identified by either a substantial imbalance between value of services
provided and payments received or the lessening of governmental burden through the
charity's operations); West Virginia: State ex rel. Cook v. Rose, 299 S.E.2d 3 (W.Va.
1982) (charitable hospital must provide free and below cost services to those unable to
pay under reasonable rules and regulations to be entitled to property tax exemption).
64. E.g., Calloway Community Hosp. v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. App. 1988).
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A minority of jurisdictions have apparently concluded that
charitable hospitals providing little or no free care are still
entitled to the tax exemption.65  In these states, the courts
have extrapolated from the earlier rule that a charitable hospi-
tal might be allowed to serve paying patients as well as its
charity clientele to a new rule that the provision of services to
paying patients constitutes charity in and of itself. They
appear to have done so by a process of reverse logic, concluding
that changes in hospital operations and administration, includ-
ing the increased attention on paying patients, necessitate
broadened standards for exemption.66
The question of charity care also comes up in the case of
non-hospital institutions in the health and social service fields.
In many jurisdictions, the question has been litigated with
respect to nursing homes, retirement communities, and low-
cost housing facilities.67 The great majority of cases find that
65. California: Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 729,
221 P.2d 31 (1950) (hospital providing services to rich and poor entitled to property tax
exemption); cf. Fredericka Home v. San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d 68
(1950) (life care community not required to extend free services to the poor to be
entitled to property tax exemption); Georgia: Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc.,
179 Ga. App. 270, 346 S.E.2d 368 (1986) (hospital that was not a public charity and did
not devote its income to caring for the indigent was nevertheless entitled to property
tax exemption); New York: People ex rel. Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Sexton, 267 A.D. 736,
48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y.S.2d 553, 64 N.E.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1945) (hospital
providing limited charity care entitled to property tax exemption); Vermont- Medical
Center Hosp. v. City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 611, 566 A.2d 1352 (1989) (hospital with
"open door" policy not required to dispense free care in excess of revenues received
from paying patients to be entitled to property tax exemption); Virginia: City of
Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116, S.E.2d 79 (1960) (hospital
providing some free care entitled to property tax exemption; argument that exemption
requires "considerable" or "substantial" free care rejected); Wisconsin: Milwaukee
Protestant Home v. City of Milwaukee, 41 Wisc. 2d 284, 164 N.W.2d 289 (1969) (dicta:
hospital not required to extend free services to some community residents to qualify
for property tax exemption).
66. See, e.g., Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 729, 221
P.2d 31 (1950).
67. Alaska: City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of No. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 891
(Alaska 1985) (youth hostel open to all regardless of ability to pay entitled to property
tax exemption); Arizona: Tucson Junior League of Tucson v. Emerine, 122 Ariz. 234,
594 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (community organization not providing relief to
indigent not entitled to property tax exemption); Colorado: Stanbro v. Baptist Home
Ass'n, 172 Colo. 572, 475 P.2d 23 (1970) (nursing home providing discounts to patients
unable to pay entitled to property tax exemption); United Presbyterian Ass'n v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 167 Colo. 485, 448 P.2d 967 (1969) (nursing home providing negligible
free care not entitled to property tax exemption); Connecticut- United Church of
Christ v. Town of West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 539 A.2d 573 (1988) (retirement
housing inaccessible to elderly without $73,000 down payment and income to pay $350
per month not entitled to property tax exemption); Florida: Haines v. St. Petersburg
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although these charitable institutions need not confine them-
Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (1965)
(nursing home providing minimal free care not entitled to property tax exemption;
charitable exemption requires relief to those unable to help themselves); Idaho: In Re
Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc., 106 Idaho 98, 675 P.2d 813 (1984) (retirement community
charging fees to all residents sufficient to recover expenses and providing no services
to the needy not entitled to property tax exemption); Iowa: Atrium Village v. Board of
Review, 417 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1987) (nursing home providing services only to those able
to pay not entitled to property tax exemption); Kansas: Lutheran Home, Inc. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 211 Kan. 270, 505 P.2d 1118 (1973) (nursing home providing no
charity care and charging charity patients a discounted rate not entitled to property
tax exemption); Louisiana: Ruston Hosp. v. Riser, 191 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1966)
(nursing home not admitting charity patients and charging fees to all patients not
entitled to property tax exemption); Maine: Maine AFL-CIO Housing Dev. v. Town of
Madaworka, 523 A.2d 581 (Me. 1987) (low cost housing charging rent but restricting
tenants to those with very low incomes entitled to tax exemption); Maryland:
Supervisor v. Group Health Ass'n, 308 Md. 151, 517 A.2d 1076 (1986) (HMO providing
no charity care not entitled to property tax exemption); Michigan: Retirement Homes
of Detroit v. Sylvan Township, 416 Mich. 340, 330 N.W.2d 682 (1982) (nursing home
charging fee designed to cover all costs and conditioning admission on ability to pay
not entitled to property tax exemption); Nebraska: Bethesda Found. v. County of
Saunders, 200 Neb. 574, 264 N.W.2d 664 (1978) (nursing home open to all without
regard to ability to pay and not discharging patients for inability to pay entitled to
property tax exemption); OEA Senior Citizens, Inc. v. County of Douglas, 186 Neb. 593,
185 N.W.2d 464 (1971) (nursing home not knowingly accepting patients unable to pay
not entitled to property tax exemption; fact that some residents may have been unable
to pay did not make home charitable); New Jersey: Presbyterian Homes v. Division of
Tax Appeals, 55 N.J. 275, 261 A.2d 143 (1970) (retirement community providing
services only to those able to pay not entitled to property tax exemption); New Mexico:
Mountain View Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 N.M. 649, 427 P.2d 13 (1967) (low-
cost housing facility charging tenants at cost not entitled to property tax exemption; no
evidence that public is relieved of any expense in comparison with the loss of tax
revenue); North Carolina: In Re Chapel Hill Residential Retirement Center, 60 N.C.
App. 294, 299 S.E.2d 782, review denied, 308 N.C. 386, 302 S.E.2d 249 (1983) (retirement
community not providing free services to needy not entitled to property tax
exemption); Oklahoma: Baptist Health Center v. Board of Equalization, 750 P.2d 127
(Okla. 1988); Glass v. Oklahoma Methodist Home for the Aged, 502 P.2d 1268 (Okla.
1972) (nursing homes open to all regardless of ability to pay and operating at a loss
entitled to property tax exemption); Oregon: Oregon Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Horn,
226 Or. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1961) (nursing home not providing discounts or free services
to poor not entitled to property tax exemption); Dove Lewis Memorial Emergency
Veterinary Clinic v. Department of Revenue, 301 Or. 423, 723 P.2d 320 (1986)
(veterinary hospital providing free or below cost services only by happenstance not
entitled to property tax exemption); Washington: Adult Student Housing v.
Department of Revenue, 41 Wash. App. 583, 705 P.2d 793 (1985) (low cost student
housing facilities not providing housing to students unable to pay not entitled to
property tax exemption).
A minority of states find levels of charity care not relevant to tax exemption for
non-hospital charities: Hawaii: In re Tax Appeal of Central Union Church, 63 Haw.
199, 624 P.2d 1346 (1981) (retirement community not providing free services and
charging fees to all residents entitled to excise tax exemption); Kentucky: Banahan v.
Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977) (low-income housing project
apparently not providing free services entitled to property tax exemption);
Masssachusetts: Harvard Community Health Plan v. Board of Assessors, 384 Mass. 536,
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selves to caring for the indigent, some of their resources must
be devoted to the poor.6s
If one assumes that courts will apply a similar rule to hos-
pitals, then it can be said that of the forty-odd states whose law
in the general area can be discerned, three-fourths expect hos-
pitals to provide at least a minimal volume of services to the
poor.
In summary, it appears that the most accurate definition
of the obligations generally required of charitable hospitals
under current law would be neither the above-noted "popular
and ordinary" definition nor the "legal" definition but instead
a mixture of the two. Under this intermediate definition char-
ity encompasses activities of broad social benefit like the provi-
sion of services to persons able to pay, but only if an element
of alsmgiving through care of the poor is preserved. Such a
definition conforms with public opinion 69 and reflects long-
standing judicial interpretation. 0
L. Current IRS Interpretation: The "Community Benefit"
Standard
Revenue Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 provide the current
IRS view of the charitable obligations of hospitals. The cur-
rent IRS position is founded upon a genuine concern that hos-
pitals not forget the indigent members of their communities.
However, in application, the IRS position leads to results simi-
lar to those obtained when the "legal" definition of charity is
applied.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 describes a hypothetical charitable
hospital. By indicating that a hospital exhibiting the described
characteristics would be exempt, the IRS effectively announces
its minimum criteria for exemption. The hypothetical exempt
hospital has the following characteristics: (1) a board of trust-
ees composed of prominent citizens; (2) medical staff privileges
open to all qualified physicians; (3) a full-time emergency room
in which no one requiring emergency care is denied treatment;
427 N.E.2d 1159 (1987) (HMO providing lower than average cost services to enrollees
but no charity care entitled to property tax exemption); North Dakota: Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219 N.W.2d 900, 908-09
(N.D. 1974) (nursing home which has policy of providing care without regard to ability
to pay but which has never provided free care entitled to property tax exemption).
68. See cases cited supra note 67.
69. See supra text and accompanying notes 7-11.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 31-50.
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(4) admissions limited to paying patients (including public-pay
patients), with those unable to pay referred to hospitals that
serve the indigent; and (5) operating surpluses applied to capi-
tal replacement and expansion, debt amortization, improve-
ment in patient care, and medical training, education, and
research.71
In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS professed its adherence
to the view that charitability, for purposes of Section 501(c)(3),
would be defined in the generally accepted "legal" sense.72
The IRS opined that the promotion of health through provi-
sion of hospital services to non-indigent members of the com-
munity was a distinct category of charitable activity in the
general law of charity. By this pronouncement, the IRS aban-
doned the requirement of Revenue Ruling 56-185 that charita-
ble hospitals be operated "to the extent of their financial
ability for those not able to pay .. . and not exclusively for
those who are able and expected to pay."73
However, Revenue Ruling 69-545 contains a limitation on
its relaxed standards. At common law, a trust for charitable
purposes must not benefit such a narrow class that it may not
be said to benefit the community as a whole.74 The inclusion
of this limitation on the ability of hospitals to exclude persons
unable to pay for care is significant. In effect, the exclusion of
the indigent from the hospital's benefits could, at some point,
narrow the class of charitable beneficiaries to the point where
the hospital would no longer benefit the community as a
whole. However, Revenue Ruling 69-545 indicated that the
threshold for excessive exclusion of indigent members of the
community would not be crossed by a hospital that operated a
full-time emergency room open to all persons without regard
to ability to pay.
This limitation was also addressed by Revenue Ruling 83-
157.7s In that ruling, the Service considered a hospital, other-
wise identical to the one described in Revenue Ruling 69-545,
that did not operate an emergency room because a state health
planning agency had made an independent determination that
the operation of an emergency room would be unnecessarily
duplicative of emergency facilities adequately provided by
71. Rev. Rule 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
72. Id. at 118.
73. Rev. Rul. 56-185.
74. G. BOGERT, TRUsTs, 201-207 (6th ed. 1987).
75. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
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another medical institution in the community. The ruling indi-
cated that the remaining characteristics of the hospital were
sufficient to indicate that the hospital continued to promote
the health of a sufficiently broad class of persons to benefit the
community as a whole.76
These revenue rulings do not give any obvious reasons for
abandoning the free care requirement and the open emergency
room limitation except for the conclusionary statements that
promoting health is a valid exempt purpose and that treating
paying clientele benefits the entire community. However, one
can deduce that the decisions were based in large measure on
factual assumptions about the hospital market and the accessi-
bility of hospital services to the indigent.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 was issued shortly after the pas-
sage of landmark legislation establishing Medicare, Medicaid,
and other "Great Society" programs intended to eliminate pov-
erty.77 It came shortly before the enormous inflation in medi-
cal care costs occasioned by those programs became apparent.78
Many in the health policy community and in government
believed at the time that these programs would do away with
medical indigency.79 It seems likely that the IRS assumed in
1969 that the problem of access to hospital care for persons
unable to pay had been, if not solved, converted from a tax pol-
icy matter to a health and social services budgetary question.
As a result, the IRS appears to have concluded that to require
hospitals to continue to provide free care would be meaningless
and redundant. Thus, when the IRS indicated that the hypo-
thetical qualifying hospital need not offer services without
charge to poor patients, it did so on the stated assumption that
the hospital would service the same formerly-indigent patients
through Medicare and Medicaid. In addition, there appears to
have been an assumed presence of another hospital in the com-
munity serving indigent patients to whom the minimally quali-
fying exempt hospital could refer the poor.
Revenue Ruling 83-157 is even more clearly the product of
contemporary beliefs about the hospital environment. The fac-
tual situation described in the ruling has surely never been a
76. Id. at 94-95.
77. Medicare and Medicaid were adopted in the Social Security Amendments of
1965. See generally 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH), 1 16031.
78. See generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
363-388 (1982).
79. Cf. Mancino, supra note 1, at 1043 n.109.
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common one. Health planning agencies have struggled to find
ways to encourage health facilities to serve the medically indi-
gent.8 0 Thus, the idea that a planning agency might even dis-
courage the operation of an emergency room to prevent a
hospital from being overly solicitous of the needs of the poor is
hard to imagine.81 Nonetheless, the IRS must have concluded
that situations could reasonably be expected to arise in which
the community as a whole simply did not contain indigent
patients.8 2
The IRS' optimistic view of medical indigency would com-
mand few followers today. In 1986, 39 million Americans
reported difficulty in obtaining medical care and 1 million
80. See Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of
Health Facilities to State Control, 19 INDIANA L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1986).
81. Id.
82. The interpretation of Revenue Ruling 69-545 and 83-157 suggested in the text
is similar to that reached by the United States Court of Appeals in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Simon, welfare rights
advocates sought equitable relief from the IRS, claiming that Revenue Ruling 69-545
was improperly promulgated and inconsistent with the Code. Upholding the Ruling,
the Court of Appeals stated:
In the field of health care, the changes have been dramatic. Hospitals in
the early part of this nation's history were alnshouses supported by
philanthropy and serving almost exclusively the sick poor. Today, hospitals
are the primary community health facility for both rich and poor.
Philanthropy accounts for only a minute percentage of the hospital's total
operating costs. Those costs have soared in recent years as constant
modernization of equipment and facilities is necessitated by the advances in
medical science and technology. The institution of Medicare and Medicaid in
the last decade combined with the rapid growth of medical and hospital
insurance has greatly reduced the number of poor people requiring fee or
below cost hospital services. Much of that decrease has been realized since
the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 56-185. Moreover, increasingly counties
and other political subdivisions are providing nonemergency hospitalization
and medical care for those unable to pay. Thus, it appears that the rationale
upon which the limited definition of "charitable" was predicated has largely
disappeared. To continue to base the "charitable" status of a hospital strictly
on the relief it provides for the poor fails to account for these major changes
in the area of health care.
Id. at 1288-89.
See also Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 187-88 (1978) (steady
rise in product income and growth of health insurance, Medicare and Medicaid makes
free care requirement for Hospitals an anachronism). Similar conclusions about the
outdated nature of free care requirements may be found in the court decisions of those
jurisdictions that do not require the provision of services to patients unable to pay as a
condition of state and local charitable hospital tax exemption. See, e.g., Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 151 N.W.2d 446 (1967) (advent
of present day social security and welfare programs has obviated need for hospitals and
nursing homes to provide free services to the poor).
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were unable to obtain it at all because of cost."3 Gaps in Medi-
care and Medicaid coverage and inadequate health insurance or
no insurance, even for working persons, belie the vision of uni-
versal access implicit in Revenue Ruling 69-545.84 Today, the
neighboring hospital that would accept indigent patients
turned away from the IRS' hypothetical qualifying hospital no
longer does so, and emergency rooms are closed not because
state health planning agencies find them unneeded, but to dis-
courage indigent patients from presenting themselves for
treatment.8 5
However, the IRS's approach of measuring the charitable
obligations of exempt hospitals by contemporary needs and cir-
cumstances should not be condemned. It is consistent with the
Supreme Court's pronouncement of the underlying intent of
the charitable exemption.' What is wrong about Revenue
Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 is not their analytical approach, but
their overly optimistic assumptions about the capacity of the
health care delivery system to subsidize services to the poor. 7
III. TAx EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS OF THE CHARITABLE
HOSPITAL EXEMPTION
Congress expects charitable organizations that attain
exemption from federal income tax to provide a public benefit
commensurate with the revenue loss caused by their exemp-
tion.88 Exemption is a quid pro quo for the provision of serv-
ices government would otherwise be obliged to deliver, or for
services that augment existing governmental programs.
The concept of tax exemption as an exchange originated in
the common law of charitable trusts and is frequently restated
in contemporary court decisions considering charitable hospi-
83. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, SPECIAL REPORT: ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) (1986 Survey). See generally BUTLER, Too POOR
To BE SICK: ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE FOR THE UNINSURED (1988).
84. Incomplete coverage by public and private health insurance is presented in
Perkins, Koblenz, Rosenthal, Dorn & McNulty, Health Care Rights of the Poor: An
Introduction, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 825 (1989).
85. See Melnick, Uncompensated Emergency Care in Hospital Markets in Los
Angeles County, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 514 (1989) (hospital emergency room closures
to reduce uninsured patient burden).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
87. An interesting discussion of the problems of assigning health policy matters to
tax officials is found in Fox & Schaffer, Tax Policy as Social Policy: Cafeteria Plans,
1978-1985, 12 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 609 (1987).
88. Bob J.nes Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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tals' exemption from various taxes.89 The cases do not indicate
that charitable exemptions turn on an exact accounting of the
costs of public services provided in comparison with tax reve-
nues foregone. Exemption has not, at least historically, been
conceived as a negotiated transaction between the tax authori-
ties and the exempt organization. The task of such an account-
ing would be beyond the institutional capacities of the courts.
Instead, the exchange concept appears to function as one of the
underlying assumptions that lead a legislature to grant exempt
status to a class of organizations. However, it is clearly appro-
priate to evaluate the continued utility of an exemption with
reference to its costs and benefits. As indicated above, such an
evaluation is a form of tax expenditure analysis.
A tax expenditure analysis is essential to attaining a suffi-
cient understanding of the income tax exemption for charita-
ble hospitals. Charitable hospitals first acquired their tax
exemptions when they were almsgiving organizations with
modest assets and regular deficits. 90 The tax revenue loss was
probably insignificant. Today, charitable hospitals have accu-
mulated substantial capital assets.91 Although many individual
hospitals are in difficult financial condition, the annual net
revenue of charitable hospitals, as a class, is considerable. 92 As
a result, the tax revenue loss side of the exchange equation
may have increased significantly. If, as the preceding discus-
sion suggests, some tax authorities have relaxed their require-
ments on the public benefit side, there may be a significant
imbalance in the exchange between society and hospitals.
IV. GAO's TAx EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
In response to congressional concerns that charitable hos-
pitals might be devoting fewer resources to the indigent, the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) recently undertook a
broad study of charitable hospitals' activities.9 3 One aspect of
this study was a comparison of the federal and state income
tax revenue lost as a result of the charitable hospital tax
89. See generally id
90. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
91. See Simpson & Lee, Nonprofit Community Hospital Tax Exemptions Is Over
for RevieW, WESTERN CONSORTIUM FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 1989 (unpublished manuscript)
(1987) (accrued value of California charitable hospitals exceeds $6 billion; annual
property tax revenue foregone as a result of exemption exceeds $60 million).
92. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, HOSPITAL STATISTICS (1989).
93. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 17-18.
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exemption with the amount of charity care 4 provided by chari-
table hospitals in five states.95
According to the GAO Report, 57 percent of the study hos-
pitals provided charity care with a value less than the esti-
mated value of the tax revenues foregone as a result of their
federal and state income tax exemptions.' For example, the
federal and state tax revenues forgone exceeded the amount of
charity care provided by 43 and 71 percent of charitable activi-
ties in New York and California respectively. The following
chart indicates the estimated number of hospitals that failed to
meet this theoretical standard in the states studied by the
GAO.
CHART 1




No. of Hospitals Hospitals
Iowa 30 51.7%
Michigan N/A N/A
New York 85 43.1%
California 151 71.2%
Florida N/A N/A
Note: GAO was unable to break down charity care from uncompensated care in its
analysis of Michigan and Florida. From unpublished GAO data.
When the GAO altered the equation and gave charitable
hospitals credit for care categorized as bad debt expense as
well as care categorized as charity expense, the five states'
charitable hospitals as a group provided more uncompensated
94. The GAO Report defined charity care as "services provided to patients who do
not have the means to pay all or a portion of their bills." Id. at 18 n.13.
95. Data were analyzed for all short-term acute care hospitals in California,
Florida, Iowa, Michigan and New York. Id. at 18.
96. To estimate the value of a hospital's income tax exemption, GAO applied the
average effective rate of a sample of for-profit hospital corporations to the charitable
hospitals' net incomes. The estimate significantly understates the total value of tax
exempt status because it does not include the value of the other significant tax
advantages in addition to income tax exemption, such as exemption from property or
other local taxes, tax exempt bond financing, and tax-deductible donations. The GAO
estimate is not very sensitive to changes in profitability or tax rate assumptions. Even
if the profit margin or the tax rates of the hospitals had been 50 percent less than the
one GAO used, 48 percent of the charitable hospitals studied would still have been
estimated to provide less charity care than the value of their tax exemptions.
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care than the estimated value of the tax revenues forgone.'
However, the uncompensated care expenses were not distrib-
uted evenly among hospitals.9" The GAO found that about 15
percent of the hospitals studied provided less uncompensated
care than the estimated value of their tax exemption.' These
hospitals had profit margins significantly higher than those of
other hospitals and uncompensated care expenses significantly
less than the average hospital in the state in which they are
located."° The following table shows the number of hospitals
failing the hypothetical test, and the amount of tax revenues at
stake.
CHART 2




No. of of Uncompensated Tax
Hospitals Hospitals Care Costs Exemption
Iowa 14 24 $8 $11
Michigan 7 5 1 4
New York 23 12 5 11
California 50 24 55 92
Florida 8 9 10 13
GAO's Study of Other Indigent Care Services and Policies
In summary, a significant number of charitable hospitals
in the states that the GAO studied failed to provide charity
care in an amount at least equal to the amount of taxes for-
gone for the charitable exemption. Their higher profit margins
97. Uncompensated care can be emergency, inpatient, or outpatient hospital care
given to those who cannot or do not pay their bills. It includes bad debt and charity
care. Using uncompensated care significantly overstates the magnitude of charity care
provided by hospitals. Available data indicate that only one third of uncompensated
care is defined as charity, the remainder is defined as bad debt.
98. For GAO's analysis, the most recent data available were from 1985 to 1987.
Inpatient hospital margins have declined since then and uncompensated care levels for
some hospitals have increased. However, GAO's analysis focus on the distribution of
uncompensated care among charitable hospitals. Though the absolute levels of
uncompensated care and profitability may change if different periods were analyzed,
the distribution itself is not likely to change significantly from year to year. Thus, the
GAO finding of an uneven distribution would likely remain unchanged.
99. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 27.
100. Id.
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indicate strongly that these hospitals are able to provide more
charity care if required to do so.
A. The GAO's Study of Other Indigent Care
Services and Policies
In addition to the tax expenditure analysis, the GAO
Report encompassed other aspects of hospitals' activities for
the indigent. The other aspects include: 1) the distribution of
uncompensated care among different types of hospitals state-
wide; 2) factors causing imbalances in the distribution of
uncompensated care among hospitals within single communi-
ties; and 3) the other community services provided in addition
to charity care. Comparisons between charitable and investor-
owned hospitals were made when possible.
First, the GAO analyzed the distribution of uncompen-
sated care among hospitals in the five states mentioned
above. 10' Not unexpectedly, the GAO found that the burden of
uncompensated care was not distributed equally among the
charitable hospitals studied. Large, urban teaching hospitals
had a higher share of uncompensated care expense than did
other charitable hospitals. 02 The hospitals that had lower
than average uncompensated care rates also had lower Medi-
caid patient volume,'0 3 a finding which tends to negate the
argument that Medicaid participation is an alternate form of
public service by charitable hospitals which do not provide
uncompensated care.
Second, the GAO conducted case studies in five communi-
ties to study factors affecting an uneven distribution of indi-
gent care.' °4 Factors that can influence the distribution of
indigent care among hospitals include the hospitals' admission
and staffing policies and practices, their strategic goals, their
services, and their locations. 0 5 In each community, some char-
itable hospitals' policies-such as those governing patient
admissions and transfers, physician staffing, and the setting of
strategic goals--discouraged the provision of nonemergency
care to those unable to pay for it."° The GAO found that a
majority of hospital goals concerned maintaining the hospitals'
101. Id. at 21-29.
102. Id. at 22-23.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 30-36.
105. Id. at 30.
106. Id. at 33-35.
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financial viability, improving their competitive positions,
expanding services and facilities, or developing employee skills
and personnel practices. 0 7 Although the charitable hospital
set numerous goals related to expanding medical services on
account of increased patient demand or for the purpose of
increasing their market share, the GAO found that, in general,
goals were not directed at serving low-income community
residents.
Third, the GAO surveyed a nationwide sample of hospitals
regarding other types of community services provided in addi-
tion to acute medical care.'0 8 A high percentage of hospitals,
whether their tax status was charitable or investor-owned,
reported providing community services such as health screen-
ing or health education activities."° These services were most
often offered to the community as a whole, however, and were
usually not targeted to the poor."0 Thus, it is difficult to con-
clude that the provision of these services by charitable hospi-
tals derives from charitable motivations distinct from the
marketing and public relations purposes that such services pro-
vide for investor-owned hospitals.
The GAO Report concluded that an insufficient link
existed between charitable tax status and service to the poor
for the nation's charitable hospitals."' This conclusion was
based on the uneven distribution of uncompensated care
among study hospitals, the lack of proactive policies for indi-
gent care, and the lack of factors to differentiate community
services other than charity care provided by charitable hospi-
tals from those provided by investor-owned facilities. The
GAO Report concluded that if Congress wished to encourage
charitable activities for the poor, the current criteria for
income tax exemption should be changed.112 If Congress
wished to articulate an operational test for charitable hospitals
focusing their activities on the poor, the GAO Report suggests
three alternative standards directly linked to a minimum level
of (1) care provided to Medicaid patients; (2) free care provided
to the poor; or (3) efforts to improve the health status of
107. Id. at 34-35.
108. Id. at 37-43.
109. Id. at 38-39.
110. Id. at 40-41.
111. Id. at 44.
112. Id. at 44-45.
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underserved portions of the community."'
As indicated above, the GAO Report found that in the
aggregate charitable hospitals provide more uncompensated
care than their estimated tax savings from federal and state
income tax exemption.1 4 In addition, an indeterminate, but
clearly quite large, proportion of charitable hospitals individu-
ally provides charity care and other services to the community
whose value equals or exceeds that of the tax revenues lost as
a result of their exemption." 5 These results could be read to
indicate that the current standards for tax exemption are
effective to some extent in encouraging charitable hospitals to
provide charity care. The uneven distribution of uncompen-
sated care among charitable hospitals reported by the GAO,
with uncompensated care concentrated in major urban teach-
ing institutions, suggests that other factors are at least partially
responsible. However, these results do confirm that the chari-
table hospital exemption provides a major tax subsidy to a
large number of deserving hospitals. As long as no alternative
mechanism for directly subsidizing hospitals with high levels of
charity care is in place, the results of the GAO Report do not
support removal of the charitable hospital exemption.
However, the GAO Report's results do suggest that the
test for entitlement to federal income tax exemption for chari-
table hospitals should be modified." 6 In addition to the une-
ven distribution of uncompensated care, the GAO Report
found that over half of the charitable hospitals studied pro-
vided charity care with a value less than the federal and state
income tax revenues foregone as a result of their exemp-
tions."17 There are over 180 such hospitals in New York and
California alone. It is highly unlikely that all these facilities
are located in communities with no charity care patients.
Thus, under the current exemption standards it appears to be
possible for some, perhaps a large number, of charitable hospi-
tals to enjoy a tax subsidy while ignoring the needs of the poor
or passing responsibility to public, inner-city, and teaching
hospitals.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 26-27.
115. Id. at 27.
116. Modifying the standard for exemption could be accomplished by issuance of a
new revenue ruling, or general counsel memorandum. Appendix "A" contains a draft
revenue ruling reflecting our suggestions for revised exemption criteria.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
We believe that a central feature of a modified standard
should be a requirement that charitable hospitals analyze the
health status of their communities, assess their own perform-
ance in meeting community health needs, and take appropriate
actions based on identified needs and their financial abilities to
respond. Whether, to what extent, and in what combination
charity care and community services are required would thus
come to depend more closely on the local community need for
such services.
This addition to the standards for charitable hospital
exemption would not change the exemption's doctrinal under-
pinnings. The "community benefit" standard elucidated by
Revenue Ruling 69-545 would still apply, and promoting health
by hospitalizing a paid clientele would continue to be a legally
sufficient basis for exemption. As now, a charitable hospital
would be required to serve a public, rather than private, inter-
est and would be prohibited from promoting the health of so
limited a class of beneficiaries as to be deemed to serve private
interests, rather than public interests. The difference would be
in the evidentiary test of excessive limitation of the class of
beneficiaries. In short, the current "open emergency room/
Medicare and Medicaid participation" test would be subsumed
within a "community need" test.
Changing the standard for charitable hospitals is unlikely
to cause the conversion of charitable hospitals to investor-
owned status or shifting of substantial volumes of indigent care
into already over-burdened public hospitals for several reasons.
First, leaders of the charitable hospital community have
already recognized the need to reaffirm their commitment to
target underserved parts of their communities without official
prompting from the IRS. For example, a Catholic hospital
association task force recommended that member hospitals
take steps to reaffirm their mission to the poor in a time of
increasing fiscal pressures.11 Suggested steps included improv-
ing methods for collecting information on the health needs of
the poor and integrating specific objectives and operational
guidelines for care to the poor into an annual planning and
budgeting process. Second, conversion of exempt status would
cause hospitals to forfeit sizable tax advantages, such as
118. See CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION: REPORT ON HEALTH CARE FOR THE
MEDICALLY INDIGENT BY CATHOLIC HOSPITALS 7 (1988).
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exemption from local property taxes and the ability to obtain
financing through tax exempt bonds. Compliance with the
standards we recommend appears unlikely to outweigh the
sum of the financial advantages of charitable status. Of the
hospitals scrutinized in recent years by state or local tax
authorities, we are aware of none that have elected to convert
to investor-owned status to escape further inspection. Finally,
the GAO report indicates that the hospitals that have provided
the least in charity care tend to be those having higher-than-
average financial margins." 9 Thus, hospitals that would be
most affected by the change in policy tend to be those that are
the most able to afford to provide more charitable services to
their communities without going out of business.
Our focus on community needs assessment and goal-set-
ting is a response to the GAO Report's discovery of a wide-
spread absence among study hospitals of proactive policies for
addressing issues of access to care. Although charitable hospi-
tals in the study communities set numerous goals relating to
maintaining financial viability and improving competitive posi-
tion, generally few goals were directed at serving low-income
community residents. 12 ' Because these goals are reflective of
charitable hospitals' aspirations, not merely their financial per-
formance, these findings are the GAO Report's most telling
commentary on the charitable hospitals' loss of their tradi-
tional community service orientation.
Our attention to community need assessment is also
designed to respond to the GAO Report's finding that the
admissions policies of hospitals tend to limit a majority of char-
ity care to that initiated in the emergency room.12 ' This find-
ing suggests that an effect of the current criteria for income
tax exemption may be to encourage hospitals to treat indigent
patients only when their problems are serious enough to con-
stitute medical emergencies. It is inefficient for the tax sub-
sidy to elicit charity care only as a last resort, and not to
subsidize primary or preventive services. Our expectation is
that a community need assessment would encourage hospitals
to treat charity patients before their needs reached the crisis
point.
A positive feature of our recommended approach is that it
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 25-27.
120. Id. at 34-35.
121. Id. at 32.
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tracks efforts already underway by charitable hospital industry
groups to encourage voluntary self-policing. The American
Hospital Association and Catholic Health Association have
developed self-assessment guides for nonprofit hospitals.12
With funding from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, New York
University's Wagner School of Public Service has developed a
voluntary accreditation program, known as the "Hospital Com-
munity Benefit Standards Program," for hospitals serving their
local communities.
123
Current IRS standards for hospital exemption call for a
board of directors comprised of prominent citizens in the com-
munity. 124 This rule is presumably intended to institutionalize
representation of the interests of the required beneficiaries of
charitable hospitals. Consistent with our call for strengthened
assurance that charitable hospitals not let their attention stray
from the needs of the indigent persons in its community, we
believe that a second feature of revised standards should be a
strong encouragement to charitable hospitals to include repre-
sentatives of the entire community, including low-income and
minority persons, on their boards. The IRS Exempt Organiza-
tions Division has recently indicated that a board of directors
broadly representative of the community is a key factor for
501(c)(3) HMO exemption, 12 and a similar standard is pres-
ently applied to public interest law firms.1 6 The presence of
representatives of the entire community on the Board will
help to assure that the charitable hospital's self-assessment and
goal-setting programs are responsive to the entire community's
interests.
Under current IRS standards, Medicaid participation
appears to be mandatory, and there are indications that the
Service views the presence of an open emergency room as a
virtual requirement. 127 The reason, we think, is the Service's
presumption that there are Medicaid beneficiaries needing hos-
122. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, COMMUNITY BENEFIT AND TAX-EXEMPT STATUS,
A SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR HOSPITAIS (1988); CATHOLIc HEALTH Ass'N OF THE
U.S., SociAL ACCOUNTABILrrY BUDGET (1989).
123. KOUNER & HATTiS, BENEFITTING COMMUNITIES HEALTH MANAGEMENT
QUARTERLY 6-10 (Fourth Quarter 1990).
124. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
125. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39828 (August 30, 1990), reprinted in 3 EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION TAX REV. 947, 949 (1990).
126. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662 (public
interest law firms).
127. See Remarks of Jim McGovern, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel, Employee
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pital care and persons needing emergency care but lacking the
ability to pay in essentially all U.S. communities. Revenue
Ruling 83-157 indicates that the presumption can be rebutted
by independent evidence that no community need for emer-
gency services exists."2 Our proposed standards would not
directly affect this presumption. However, the proposed stan-
dards would permit a charitable hospital to rebut the presump-
tion if a bona fide, but non independent, evaluation of
community health status and access to care. An obvious risk of
reliance upon self-evaluation and self-policing is that charita-
ble hospitals may underestimate the extent of community need
for charity care or other free or low-cost services in an effort
to reduce their obligations. By providing for representation of
low-income persons on charitable hospital boards, community
participation in the self-assessment process, and circulation of
self-assessment reports throughout the community, we hope to
make such self-deception difficult. In addition, such participa-
tion would enlist the local community as the front line of
enforcement. In the current environment of strong local con-
cern over the levels of charity care provided by hospitals, we
think it is likely that sham assessments would be rare. Addi-
tionally, the needs assessment of each hospital in the commu-
nity would be shared with the other hospitals, as well as being
available to the community at large and to the IRS in an audit.
If, however, experience showed that more than a small frac-
tion of hospitals were unable to responsibly conduct self-assess-
ment and goal-setting, we would support either a return to
mandatory charity care quotas, or a repeal of the exemption
for hospitals.
It would certainly not be a precipitous step for the IRS to
issue a new revenue ruling or other guidance to charitable hos-
pitals. Revenue Ruling 69-545 was issued 13 years after Reve-
nue Ruling 56-185, its predecessor. The hospital industry has
undergone dramatic changes in the twenty years since the issu-
ance of Revenue Ruling 69-545. The IRS has the authority to
Benefits and Exempt Organizations Division, ALI-ABA Program on Health Care in
the 90's, (September, 1990), reprinted in 3 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 893, 894-5 (1990).
128. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94 provides that a hospital that does not operate
an open emergency room because a state health planning agency has made an
independent determination that the operation would be unnecessary and duplicative
can rely on other factors, such as Medicare and Medicaid participation, to indicate that
it promotes the health of a sufficiently broad class of persons to benefit the
community.
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reconsider the nature of charitable hospitals' obligations in
light of contemporary circumstances, and to adjust the stan-
dards accordingly. A suggested revenue ruling considering
those adjusted standards is contained in Appendix "A".
Taken together, our suggested revised standards for fed-
eral income tax exemption would prompt charitable hospitals
to reaffirm their historical commitment to serving the poor.
They would underscore the requirements for income and prop-
erty tax exemptions for hospitals in most states. They would
require relatively minor administrative costs on the part of
federal tax authorities and, for many hospitals, would require
minimal changes in behavior.
It is important to recognize that the question of a charita-
ble hospital's tax exemption appears against a backdrop of
larger health policy concerns, such as gaps in the nation's
health insurance mechanisms and weaknesses in federal and
state health programs. Adjusting the tax exemption standards
for charitable hospitals is no panacea for the problems of
access to medical care for the uninsured and indigent in our
society. However, redistributing the tax subsidy more equita-
bly among charitable hospitals, leveling the playing field for
investor-owned hospitals, and improving the linkage between
tax dollars foregone and service to the medically needy are jus-
tification enough for the changes we recommend. Further-
more, these considerations would be sufficient grounds for
changing the tax exemption rules even if Congress were to
mandate expanded health insurance coverage and/or extend
the coverage of Medicaid or other need-based programs of
healthcare for the poor.
However, if the suggested revisions were adopted, it would
be important to subject them, after the passage of several
years, to an examination of their efficacy similar to the analy-
sis recently conducted by the GAO. If such an analysis indi-
cated a continuing discrepancy between tax revenues foregone
and the value of services provided by charitable hospitals, it
would then be appropriate to consider more drastic measures,
including imposing minimum percentages of free or below-cost
care, or repealing the charitable hospital federal income tax
exemption.
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Do the nonprofit hospitals described below qualify for
exemption from federal income tax as organizations described
in Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code?
B. FACTS
Situation No. 1: Hospital A is a 250-bed community hospi-
tal located in a city with one other community hospital and a
public city hospital. Twenty-one years ago Hospital A was
identical in all respects to Hospital A described in Situation 1
of Revenue Ruling 69-545.' 9 Today a substantial proportion of
the population is Medicaid-eligible, medically uninsured or
undersinsured, and Hospital A's financial condition has eroded
over the years. Inpatient care expenses exceeded inpatient
care revenues in the most recent fiscal year, but Hospital A
realized an overall net gain as a result of outpatient service
revenue. Hospital A participates in Medicare. Hospital A has
a contract with the State to provide inpatient services to Medi-
caid beneficiaries. Hospital A continues to provide emergency
room services to all members of the community without regard
to ability to pay.
Hospital A's Board is broadly representative of the entire
community including the medically underserved. The Board
recently conducted a self-assessment to (1) determine commu-
nity health status, including that of low-income and minority
groups; (2) measure accessibility of hospital services in the
community, including physical and financial barriers to access;
and (3) evaluate the hospital's performance in meeting commu-
nity health needs, including treatment of indigent patients and
compliance with legal requirements concerning emergency
care. The entire community was invited to participate and the
assessment report was circulated widely. Copies were provided
to other community hospitals. The assessment documented
needed improvements to the physical plant and confirmed the
existence of an indigent population in the community whose
needs for hospital care may exceed the ability of Hospital A
and the public hospital to satisfy. It also documented high can-
cer incidence in minority neighborhoods, and community-wide
129. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-1 C.B. 117.
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ignorance of diet and cancer issues. In response to the assess-
ment Hospital A's Board announced to the community that a
percentage of its net revenues from exempt function activities,
determined annually on the basis of the hospital's overall
financial position and the need to apply excess revenues to
improving facilities, equipment, patient care, medical training,
education, and research, would be set aside for charity care. In
addition, the hospital would assist a city-operated cancer
screening program for minorities and run a series of public ser-
vice announcements on nutrition in the local media.
Situation No. 2: Hospital B is the other community hospi-
tal in Hospital A's city. Twenty-one years ago Hospital B was
identical in all respects to the Hospital A described in Situation
1 of Revenue Ruling 69-545."3 Since then Hospital B has
increased its share of private-pay patients through aggressive
marketing, satellite services in the city's expanding suburbs,
and recruitment of physicians who practice in profitable spe-
cialties. Hospital B participates in Medicare. Hospital B did
not submit a bid to the State for a Medicaid contract. Hospital
B's Board recently accepted a local consulting firm's recom-
mendation that the level of service offered in its emergency
room be downgraded since so few patients are admitted
through that route. Hospital B has no patient transfer policy,
but its practice is to transfer any medically stable patient who
is unable to pay to either Hospital A or the city hospital.
C. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
for exemption from federal income tax of organizations organ-
ized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) pro-
vides that the term "charitable" is used in Section 501(c)(3) in
its generally accepted legal sense. Charitable trust law makes
clear that the definition of charity depends upon contemporary
standards, and that qualification for charitable exempt status is
not perpetual or immutable. 1
3 1
The IRS has recognized that in the general law of charity
the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable pur-
pose. A nonprofit organization whose purpose and activity are
130. Id.
131. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
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providing hospital care is promoting health and may therefore
qualify as organized and operated in furtherance of a charita-
ble purpose. Such an organization is not absolutely required to
admit and treat patients who are unable to pay.'32
However, section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) provides the collat-
eral rule that an organization will not be considered organized
or operated exclusively for charitable purposes unless it serves
a public, rather than private, interest. An organization that
promotes the health of a limited class of beneficiaries serves
the private interests of those individuals rather than a public
interest. A hospital that is exempt as a Section 501(c)(3) entity
must not exclude members of the community such that it
ceases to benefit the community as a whole. The totality of the
hospital's operations must be examined to determine whether
private or community interests are being served. A nonprofit
hospital that wishes to obtain exemption under Section
501(c)(3) should be able to present meaningful evidence that
its entire community benefits from the totality of its
operations.
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that Hospital A's
operations serve the entire community. A key factor is Hospi-
tal A's assessment of community need for hospital and health-
related services and the evidence of meaningful actions taken
in response to identified community needs. These include care
for those covered by Medicare and Medicaid, health promotion
and education programs open to the community, emergency
services open to the entire community without regard to ability
to pay, and the set-aside of a portion of surplus for charity
care. Other important factors include the broadly representa-
tive composition of its Board, public participation in the assess-
ment process, and public notice of the hospital's community
service programs.
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Hospital B
operates to serve the community as a whole. A key factor is its
absence of a meaningful effort to identify and respond to the
interests of the entire community. Hospital B's policy of limit-
ing admission to paying patients, failure to bid on a Medicaid
contract, emergency room downgrading, and transfer policy
cannot be justified in light of the available evidence of under-
served indigent and Medicaid-eligible patients in its commu-
nity. Another important factor is Hospital B's lack of a
132. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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transfer policy, which violates the anti-dumping provisions of
COBRA.13 3 Repeated violations of federal or state law whose
purpose is to protect the health of the entire community may
be grounds for denial of exemption.
D. EFFECT ON OTHER REVENUE RULINGS
Rev. Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 are amplified.
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 d.(d) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 14:633
